

#6

MEMORANDUM

2406-XX

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

April 17, 1980

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: WILLIAM ODOM ^{WO}
JASPER WELCH ^W

SUBJECT: Draft PD on Nuclear Employment Policy (TS)

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five me a
game-plan after
7- discussion
will Slocombe

WJ
(4/18/80)

We have completed our initial review of Harold's memorandum commenting on our draft PD and enclosing his proposed revision. We would make the following general points:

(1) He did respond, and in a constructive manner. (TS)

(2) He characterized our draft as "sound an approach and consistent with" current thinking in the Pentagon and ongoing implementation. (TS)

(3) His proposed revision retains the structure of our draft and most of the language. (TS)

(4) His proposed revision does include a fair number of modifications to the concepts in our draft as well as some additions. (TS)

OK

We find some of the changes helpful, some of them confusing, and some of them, in our judgment, counterproductive. Walt Slocombe has offered to explain their rationale behind the changes, and we intend to take him up on that offer today if possible. After we confer with Walt we will be in a better position to advise you as to which of Harold's changes you should object, which to modify, and which to accept. (TS)

On balance, we expect that a mutually agreeable draft can be achieved without a major struggle. There is the possibility, however, that our conference with Slocombe could uncover underlying differences of view, not clearly evident in the language of the proposed revision, which would require resolution. (TS)

We have attached a copy of Harold's memo and his revision in which important points and changes are highlighted. (U)

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Review on April 17, 2000
Extended by Z.Brzezinski
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)

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Per 2/16/11 NSC email

NSC-DR-091

BY: J NARA DATE 2/17/11

15 April 1980


PD on Nuclear Force Employment

Proposed Revision

In PD-18, I directed a follow-on study of our targeting policy for nuclear forces. I have reviewed the results and considered their implications for maintaining deterrence in the present decade, particularly in light of the growing Soviet strategic weapons arsenal and its capabilities.

The most fundamental objective of our strategic policy remains nuclear deterrence. I reaffirm the directive of PD-18 to that effect. The purpose of this directive is to outline policies and actions in the nuclear force employment field to secure that continuing objective.

Our strategic nuclear forces must be able to deter nuclear attacks not only on our own country but also on our forces overseas, as well as on our friends and allies, and to contribute to deterrence of non-nuclear attacks. To continue to deter in an era of strategic nuclear equivalence, it is necessary to have nuclear (as well as conventional) forces such that in considering aggression against our interests any adversary would recognize that no plausible outcome would represent a victory on any plausible definition of victory. To this end and so as to preserve the possibility of bargaining effectively to terminate the war on acceptable terms that are as favorable as practical, if deterrence fails initially, we must be capable of fighting successfully so that the adversary would not achieve his war aims and would suffer costs that are unacceptable, or in any event greater than his gains, from having initiated an attack.



The employment of nuclear forces must be effectively related to operations of our general purpose forces. Our doctrines for the use of forces in nuclear conflict must insure that we can pursue specific policy objectives selected by the National Command Authorities at that time from general guidelines established in advance.

Entire contents TSS.

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FOR 2/2/09 JOD LETTER
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15 April 1980

PD on Nuclear Force Employment


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JS 3.3 (b) (5)



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
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Authority per 7/14/11 DOD ltr.
NARA BAE Date 9/19/11

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These requirements form the broad outline of our evolving countervailing strategy. To meet these requirements, improvements should be made to our forces, their supporting C3 and intelligence, and their employment plans and planning apparatus, to achieve a high degree of flexibility, enduring survivability, and adequate performance in the face of enemy actions. The following principles and goals should guide your efforts in making these improvements.

Pre-planned options. The Single Integrated Operational Plan will provide pre-planned targeting for strikes against the Soviet Union, its allies and its forces. It should provide for retaliatory strikes that will be effective, even if the Soviets attack first, without warning, and in a manner designed to reduce our capability as much as possible. It will be developed with flexible sub-options that will permit, to the extent that survival of C3 allows,




Flexibility. In addition to pre-planned options we need an ability to design nuclear employment plans on short notice in response to the latest and changing circumstances. This capability must be comprehensive enough to allow rapid construction of plans that integrate strategic force employment with theater nuclear force employment and general purpose force employment for achieving theater campaign objectives and other national objectives (when pre-planned response options are not judged suitable in the circumstances.)

To assure that we can design such plans, our goal should be to have the following capabilities on a continuing basis in peacetime, during crises, and during protracted conflict:

- Staff capabilities to develop operational plans on short notice and based on the latest intelligence existing within all unified and specified commands which have nuclear forces.
- Staff capabilities at the seat of Government to support the NCA for coordinating and integrating the nuclear force employment for all commands.
- Intelligence and target development capabilities which permit damage assessment and acquisition of a broad range of targets, fixed and mobile, on a timely basis for military operations.

⑥ Reserve Forces. Pre-planned options should be capable of execution while leaving a substantial force in secure reserve and capable of being withheld for possible subsequent use. The forces designated for the reserve should be the most survivable and enduring strategic systems consistent with the need for a flexible and varied reserve force capable of being effectively employed against a wide target spectrum and withheld if necessary for a prolonged period.


3.3 (b) (5)



⑦
⑧ Strategic and theater nuclear forces should to the extent feasible be used in combination with, and in support of, general purpose forces to achieve that objective.

3.3. (b) (5)

More specifically, the following categories of



⑨ There must be extensive and effective coverage in the pre-planned options of all categories.

⑩ 3.3. (b) (5)

11 Command, Control and Communications, and Intelligence. Flexibility in contingency planning and in operations will be highly dependent on our C3I capabilities, including their ability to acquire targets, assess damage, and survive attack. Strategic stability in an era of essential equivalence depends as much on survivability, endurance and reconstitutability of C3I capabilities (commensurate with those of the forces themselves) as it does on the size and character of strategic arsenals.

PD/NSC-53 directs that our C3I programs and our guidance to telecommunications common carriers support the development and maintenance of such capabilities. In addition, PD/NSC-41 directs that we seek greater continuity of government should deterrence fail. Implementation of PD/NSC-53 and PD/NSC-41 must be pursued in parallel with that of this employment directive.

12 The relationship of acquisition policy to employment policy. Our acquisition programs must be evaluated in terms of their support for the employment policy ordered by this directive. The required flexibility, survivability, endurance, and target destruction capability must be taken into account in developing programs for acquiring nuclear weapons systems, and their supporting C3I systems as GSI needed to support our countervailing strategy.

Implementation. As new targeting capabilities are developed, and as our operational and staffing support change to meet the foregoing directives, they must be reviewed and tested to validate their feasibility and soundness. For that purpose:

- At least two exercises involving the National Command Authorities should be conducted each year to evaluate our capabilities and our employment doctrines.
- Continued study and analysis of means to improve and refine our countervailing strategy of general conflict should be conducted by the Department of Defense.
- The results of these exercises, studies and analysis will provide the bases for modification and any further development of employment and acquisition policy.
- A report will be rendered to the President at least annually on our employment plans, including, but not limited to, on the size and capability of the reserve forces, the degree of flexibility available, limiting factors in achieving flexibility, and the status of programs to provide improvements.
- Any change or new pre-planned options will be submitted to the President for his review and approval, in accordance with current procedures.

13 NSDM-242 is superseded by this directive.

1. This paragraph should be omitted. It introduces a number of points which are at odds with the overall thrust of the PD:
 - It puts the emphasis "first of all" on "industry and cities." We retain this city-busting option in the pre-planned options section. No need for it up front.
 - "Controlling escalation" is used here in its traditional sense of exchanging LNOs for psycho-political effects, precisely the kind of thing which is wholly incredible. (S)
2. Specific reference to Cuba, SRV, North Korea, and the PRC is added to provide a basis for targeting these states. Our draft excluded them because they can be treated in the implementation section under review of pre-planned options. We can accept this or we would replace it with: "All countries now targeted with pre-planned options shall remain so, subject to annual review as prescribed in the implementation section below." (S)
letter
3. This is the "launch from under attack" section. Brown seems committed to it. You have heard my protestations. It is operationally a very dangerous thing. And it is an eventual excuse for not deploying MX. This PD is probably not the place to debate this issue. (S)
4. Brown added this clause about pre-planned options. It is vintage Brown, hedging against a clear commitment to flexibility of the sort in this section. Not a critical point to debate. (S)
5. "At the seat of government" is Brown's language designed to prevent this staff role from accruing to the NSC staff. My original reference mentioned the JCS. Accept Brown's language. We want a better staff in the Pentagon, not at the White House. (S)
6. We said pre-planned options should be "without use of weapons designated for the reserve forces." Brown's language allows the use of some but "leaving a substantial force in the secure reserve." At issue is the size of the reserve. You would seek a larger one sooner. The last sentence about "most survivable" is an addition. We can accept it. (S)

Brown has omitted our sentence about a significant increase in the next two years. (S)

Debate this one with him. His own concept of a countervailing strategy seems to require a larger and coercive reserve. It can be notionally targeted, but in principle it should be held

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for "flexible" use to "countervail" against any surprising enemy operations as a conflict unfolds. We can accept this language but you need to insist on some schedule for increasing the reserve. Brown can take the weapons from the "urban-industrial" targets, i.e., city-busting/economic recovery, which we are trying to move away from. (S)

7. and 8. "Categories" versus "priorities." Brown wants to avoid a ranking of priorities, and he wants to re-insert the city-busting category. Again, vintage Brown, on the fence, looking first to one side and then the other. (S)

We should seek a compromise by accepting "category" in exchange for deletion of the clause, "While preserving a major force capability for either early use or urban-industrial targets . . ." Brown gets the effect of this clause in the later paragraph beginning, "In addition, pre-planned options . . . on general industrial capacity." (S)

9. "In the near term, . . ." has been added. This puts the emphasis on "fixed" instead of "mobile" targets. We can ask Brown to drop this and leave it for his internal DOD implementation guidance. He is mixing implementation in the wrong place. This PD should be more brief and general, not loaded with implementing detail. (S)
10. Brown omits our statement, "This consideration should not be allowed to prevent effective attacks against targets that would not otherwise be struck under our countervailing strategy." Discussion with Slocombe revealed that Brown may have misunderstood this. His substitute, "In order to permit the NCA . . . methods of estimating collateral damage . . . should be improved" does not perform the function of our sentence, a function sorely needed: it tells the planner that when he has a problem of limiting collateral damage in striking key military targets, the President would generally prefer to destroy the military target anyway. These trade-offs are so frequent that planners can't refer them all to Brown. Thus, a general criterion, like our statement, is an important clue for the planner. Brown will probably accept a revised version. (S)
11. Brown added the underlined, "commensurate with those of the forces themselves . . ." This is gratuitous, another implementing concept better left to DOD internal guidance. He might be willing to drop it. (S)
12. Brown left out "and general purpose forces" and added the underlined phrase, "needed . . ." He believes it asked for too much to tie nuclear employment policy to acquisition policy of tanks, ships, and airplanes. We can let him have this point, but the tie is important, e.g., "EMP-hardening" of aircraft, anti-radiation characteristics of tanks and ships. Failure to make the tie let us buy NEACP without EMP-hardening. Now we are paying for that modification. (S)
13. The changed wording in two implementing procedures is of no great consequence. We can accept it. (S)